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Abstract 
 The strong connection between emotion and memory is apparent in the vividness of 
flashbulb memories formed from an emotionally arousing event, such as the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th, 2001. In addition, older adults are thought to differ from young adults in both 
their memory abilities and their emotional experience. I analyzed the emotional intensities 
reported by people of different age groups in response to the events of 9/11, as well as the 
accuracy of their remembered and predicted reactions over the course of 3 years. Sadness was 
the most intensely experienced emotion by all age groups. An overall trend of increased intensity 
with age was also observed for all emotions except fear and frustration, which remained constant 
across age groups, and confusion, which declined with age. Emotional intensity significantly 
decreased one year following the attack, but then stabilized, with the exception of shock, which 
continued to decline. Additionally, people overestimated the intensity of their previous emotional 
reactions and underestimated their future feelings toward the attack, regardless of age group. 
Historical events may differ from personal events in terms of age and cohort differences in 
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Emotional Telescoping: Distorted Memories and Predictions  
of Emotional Intensity for the Events of 9/11 
 Memory and emotion are closely intertwined. We remember emotional events more 
vividly than non-emotional ones. For example, many people have vivid memories for where they 
were when they learned of the attacks on 9/11/2001. However, very few people could tell you 
where they were or what they were doing on 9/21/2010, even though that date is much more 
recent. The connections between memory and emotion may help to guide our future behaviors; it 
has been suggested that one of the major advantages of memory for the past is to help us plan for 
the future, and that emotion directs those plans by telling us what we value and what we want to 
avoid (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007; see also David Brooks’s new popular book The Social 
Animal, 2011). (“Last time I sat next to that person, they gave me a dirty look and made me feel 
bad; I’m going to sit next to that other person, who bought me a drink last time and made me feel 
pretty good!”).  
 If this system is to work optimally, we should remember our past emotions and predict 
our future ones with a high degree of accuracy. Do we? In this thesis, I tried to answer that 
question by analyzing people’s current, remembered, and predicted emotional intensities for the 
events on 9/11/2001, and examining how they changed over the course of three years. In 
addition, older adults are often thought to have less intense emotions (Schiebe & Carstensen, 
2010; Charles & Piazza, 2007), to be better at handling their emotions (Kafetsios, 2004), and to 
be biased against negative emotions (Charles & Carstensen, 2008). I therefore also examined 
how emotional intensity and the accuracy of remembered and predicted emotions might differ 
across different adult age groups, from 17 to 73 year olds. 
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 Brown and Kulik (1977) coined the term “flashbulb” to describe the vivid memory of a 
surprising and emotionally arousing event, such as the 9/11 attacks. According to research, 
flashbulb events are rated as more important and emotional than control events (Kvavilashvili, 
Mirani, Schlagman, Erskine, & Kornbrot, 2010). There is some controversy as to whether these 
highly emotional memories are also more accurate. For followers of Pope John Paul II at the 
time of his death (Tinti, Schmidt, Sotgio, Testa, & Curci, 2009) and victims of Turkey’s 
Marmara earthquake in 1999 (Er, 2003), remembrance of the event was directly dependent on 
the strength of their emotional response. That is, if the event was rated as highly emotional, it 
was recalled with greater accuracy. However, this is not always the case. Despite self-reports of 
intense emotional responses to the attacks of 9/11, several studies have shown that accuracy for 
flashbulb memories decreased over time at the same rate as accuracy for control memories. 
(Wolters & Goudsmit, 2005; Talarico & Rubin, 2003). Hirst et al. (2009) demonstrated that the 
emotional aspects of memories of 9/11 are actually forgotten more quickly than these memories’ 
other features even though emotions are important to each individual when forming the memory.  
 There is much less research available pertaining to the prediction of one’s emotional state 
than there is about remembering it. However, it has been found that certain biases exist that 
consistently lead to inaccurate predictions. For both positive and negative events (e.g., good or 
bad grades on an academic exam; passing or failing a driving exam), emotional reactions were 
anticipated to be much more intense than they were actually experienced at the time of the event 
(Buehler & McFarland, 2001). When making these anticipatory judgments, people appear to 
focus solely on the event in question, magnifying its importance, while failing to take into 
account to take their past experience or the impact that other events that will occur at the same 
time as the target event.  Manipulations that encourage the consideration of the target event in 
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these contexts can reduce the future intensity bias (Buehler & McFarland, 2001; Wesp, Sandry, 
Prisco, & Sarte, 2009; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). 
 Older adults present an interesting set of contradictions when considering emotion’s 
interactions with memory and future predictions. On the one hand, older adults typically have 
worse memories than young adults. However, they also have more experience in facilitating, 
managing and understanding their emotions (Kafetsios, 2004), which might lead to the 
hypothesis that they would be better at predicting how their emotions will change over time. 
Nielsen, Knutson and Carstensen (2008) showed that when predicting future emotions, the 
elderly report less of a valence change than young adults, possibly because they have more 
insight into their affective states. In another set of contradictions, older adults initially react less 
strongly to emotional events (Schiebe & Carstensen, 2010) and report less intense reactions 
overall (Charles & Piazza, 2007), but are also often described as being more emotion-focused 
than are young adults (Kafetsios, 2004; McConatha, Leone, & Armstrong, 1997). 
 Some of these age effects may be especially pronounced for negative emotions, which are 
presumably the predominant ones surrounding an event like 9/11. Research has shown that, over 
the course of a lifetime, negative emotions decline with age, whereas positive ones tend to 
increase (Grühn, Kotter-Grühn, & Röcke, 2010; Charles & Carstensen, 2009; Magai, Consedine, 
Krivoshekova, Kudadjie-Gyamfi, & McPherson, 2006; Mroczek & Kolarz, 1998). For instance, 
the elderly report lower levels of anger than their youthful counterparts in unpleasant situations 
(Charles & Carstensen, 2008), during social interactions (Charles & Piazza, 2007) and in regards 
to a family loss (Kunzman & Richter, 2009). This could be a result of their tendency to ruminate 
less about emotionally upsetting events than younger generations (McConatha et al., 1997). This 
correlation between old age and attention towards positive and away from negative stimuli has 
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been termed the “positivity effect” (Charles & Carstensen, 2008; Comblian, D’Argenbeau, & 
Van der Linden, 2005).  
 This particular study focuses specifically on the flashbulb memories people formed 
following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. It seeks to investigate not only which, if 
any, emotions are experienced more intensely than others, but also how emotional responses 
change over time. It is also a goal to examine the accuracy with which people are able to predict 
and recall their emotional reactions. Based on the fact that older adults experience emotions less 
intensely than young adults, older adults are expected to report lower intensities than their 
younger counterparts, while emotional intensity will decrease during the time between the actual 
attack and the following three years for every age group. Research indicating that flashbulb 
memories are rapidly forgotten predicts that people will underestimate their initial emotional 
responses when remembering the event. Conversely, when predicting their future emotions, 
people will overestimate their feelings due to the tendency to anticipate intense emotions in the 
future. Possible effects of age on these phenomena will also be examined.  
Method  
Participants and Recruitment 
This is a secondary analysis of an existing dataset. One week after September 11th, 
subjects were recruited on or around the college campuses of the original collaborators (Hirst et 
al., 2009) to complete a survey about the attack. Participants were from New York, NY; Boston 
and Cambridge, MA; New Haven, CT; Washington, DC; St. Louis, MO; Santa Cruz, CA; and 
Palo Alto, CA. All participants were asked to indicate if they were willing to be contacted the 
following year for a second survey. Eleven months later, these participants were re-contacted and 
sent the second survey if they consented to receive it. Additional subjects were also recruited in 
the same manner in order to control for possible effects of previous participation. A third survey 
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was sent two years later to the same participants from the initial two questionnaires who also 
consented, as well as a new group of control subjects.  
 For Survey 1, subjects were recruited between September 17th and September 21st, 2001; 
between August 5th and August 26th, 2002 for Survey 2; and between August 9th and August 
20th, 2004 for Survey 3. Participants were given one week to fill out a paper survey and return it 
to experimenters. An electronic version was also available for Surveys 2 and 3; those choosing to 
complete the Web-based version were given two weeks to return their surveys to experimenters. 
 Thirty-eight percent of those completing the first survey completed the second, whereas 
both Surveys 2 and 3 were completed by 18% of participants that completed Survey 1 (Hirst et 
al., 2009). Data from both the electronic and paper forms were merged to yield 384 participants 
that responded to all three surveys. The current analysis is restricted to these participants.  In 
addition, I restricted analysis to those subjects 73 years old and younger, as the sample sizes for 
participants older than this were very small, bringing the final number of participants to 352. 
Surveys 
 Three separate surveys were written for each of the testing periods. They were all 
approximately 17 pages in length and took about 45 minutes to complete. A copy of each survey 
can be found at http://911memory.nyu.edu (Hirst et al., 2009).   
 Each survey began with a general statement of the aim of the experiment and a consent 
form. Various probes were used and questions were grouped accordingly. For Survey 1, 
administered within the 2 weeks after the attack, Questions 1-6 pertained to flashbulb memories 
and their consistency, Questions 7-11 were concerned with the accuracy of event memories, and 
Questions 12-23 were relevant to predictors. Some examples of these predictors include 
consequentiality in terms of personal loss and inconvenience, the intensity of emotional 
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responses, and rehearsal, as assessed by attention to media coverage of the event. This study 
focuses on the six basic emotions that participants rated on a 5-point scale, with 5 being the most 
intense reaction and 1 being the least intense. These emotions are Sadness, Anger, Fear, 
Confusion, Frustration, and Shock. The survey concluded with 8 demographic questions.  
 Surveys 2 and 3 consisted of these same questions, plus additional questions for the 
flashbulb memory predictors. Participants were asked how confident they were that their 
recollection of the time, source, place, etc. of the event was accurate, as well as how accurately 
they believed they would remember the time, source, place, etc. in the future. Survey 2 asked 
subjects to predict two years from the time of the survey while Survey 3 inquired about seven 
years in the future. Responses were rated in a scale of 1-5, with 5 being the highest rating.  
Coding 
 A coding manual was developed after 50 responses to Survey 1 were assessed, in order to 
establish the nature of each question’s reply. This manual can be found at 
http://911memory.nyu.edu (Hirst et al., 2009).  
 At the end of the coding process for each survey, 10% of the surveys were randomly 
selected for re-coding. This was to evaluate the interrater reliability of the coding manual. Either 
kappas or Cronbach’s alphas (whichever was appropriate) were then calculated for each 
question. For both short-answer and open-ended questions, reliability ratings all exceeded 0.80 
(Hirst et al., 2009).  
Results 
 Examination of the data showed that chronological age did not have a linear relationship 
with most of the dependent variables. Because of the historical nature of the event in question, a 
generational cohort might be a more appropriate independent variable. I therefore divided the 
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subjects into five cohort groups, as defined by Schuman and Scott (1989). See Table 1 for the 
birth years, age at Survey 1, number of participants, and a description of the memorable events 
and key characteristics associated with each cohort. 
The Greenhouse-Geisser correction for sphericity was used in all analyses, but in the text 
degrees of freedom are reported in integers for easier readability. A significance level of .01 was 
used in order to avoid misleading statistically significant differences of little or no practical 
import (for a discussion of this issue and how it specifically relates to relatively large-sample 
studies of memories for 9/11, see Luminet et al., 2004).   
Initial Emotional Intensities 
There was a main effect of Emotion, F(5, 1735) = 67.88, p < .0005. As seen in Figure 1, 
Sadness was the most intensely experienced emotion for all cohort groups and confusion was 
rated the lowest. Anger, Fear, Frustration, and shock were all experienced at intermediate levels. 
The cohorts did not differ in their overall ratings of emotional intensity, F(4, 347) = 1.16, p = 
.33, however, there was a significant Emotion x Cohort interaction, F(20, 1735) = 2.74, p < 
.0005. One-way ANOVAs for each emotion using Cohort as the independent variable found that 
the different emotions showed different patterns across the cohorts. Fear and Frustration were 
generally equal across the cohorts, both F < 1. Sadness (F(4,351) = 3.18, p = .014) and Shock 
(F(4,351) = 2.07, p = .08), showed marginal increases until the third cohort (Baby Boomers 2), 
then flattened out.  Anger showed the largest cohort effects, sharply increasing after the first two 
cohorts, F(4,351) = 4.66, p = .001.  Confusion showed a trend in the opposite direction, F(4,351) 
= 2.13, p = .08; it was highest for the youngest cohorts and tended to decrease for the older 
cohorts. 
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 The reduction in confusion ratings across the cohorts helps to ameliorate the potential 
concern that participants of different ages and cohorts might be using the rating scales differently 
(e.g., that older cohorts might simply be less likely to use the lower end of the scale; Schwarz & 
Knäuper, 2000).  To further address this concern, I conducted a parallel analysis for confidence 
in reported memories. There was no observable difference between cohorts, F < 1. Figure 2 
shows that the confidence ratings for most memory types are stable across age groups. Overall, 
these results do not support the idea that the cohorts systematically differed in their use of the 
rating scales in a way that could confound the analysis of emotion-related variables.  
Change in Emotional Response  
 The Occasion x Emotion x Cohort interaction did not yield a significant result, F(40, 
3470) = 1.25, p = .16, although there was a significant Occasion x Emotion effect, F(10, 3470) = 
13.67, p < .0005. To break down the Occasion x Emotion interaction, separate within-subjects 
ANOVAs for each emotion were run using Occasion as the within-subjects variable, with 
repeated contrasts. All emotions showed a significant effect of occasion and a significant drop in 
emotional intensity from Survey 1 to Survey 2, all p < .0001.  Between Surveys 2 and 3, 
emotional intensity remained flat (all F < 1 except Confusion, which showed a nonsignificant 
trend to increase, p = .08), with the exception of Shock, which continued to show sharp declines, 
F(1, 351) = 37.82, p < .0005, as seen in Figure 3f.  
 There was also a significant Occasion x Cohort interaction, F(8, 694) = 2.55, p = .01. 
Tests of within-subjects contrasts indicated that the cohorts did not differ from each other in their 
change from Survey 1 to Survey 2, F <1. However, there was a marginal difference between the 
cohorts in how they changed from Survey 2 to Survey 3, F(4, 347) = 2.42, p = .05. Inspection of 
the means (See Figures 3a-f) suggested that while most cohorts showed consistent responses 
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between Surveys 2 and 3, Cohort 3 still tended to decline, and the oldest cohort actually showed 
a tendency towards increased emotion.  
Accuracy in Remembering Initial Emotional Response  
 Accuracy in remembering emotion was analyzed using a 5 (Cohort:  0-4) x 3 (Occasion: 
Actual emotion at time 1, remembered emotion at time 2, remembered emotion at time 3) x 6 
(Emotion) design.  At all occasions, the emotion being rated (or recalled) was the emotional 
intensity experienced within the two weeks following the attacks. 
 In general, people remembered their emotions following the attack as being more intense 
than they actually were, as seen in Figure 4. This effect differed by emotion, with a significant 
Occasion x Emotion interaction, F(10, 3460) = 13.32, p < .0005.  However, all cohorts showed 
similar patterns of over-remembering the intensity of their emotions: Cohort did not interact with 
Occasion (p > .30 for both the 3-way Cohort x Occasion x Emotion and the 2-way Cohort x 
Occasion interactions). 
 To understand the Occasion x Emotion interaction, separate ANOVAs with Occasion as 
the within-subjects factor were run for each emotion, with contrasts comparing each occasion.  
The pattern for most emotions was that people’s memories of their emotional intensity at 
Occasion 2 was greater than their actual emotional intensity rating at Occasion 1, p < .0005, but 
that memory for emotional intensity at Occasion 1 was stable between Occasions 2 and 3, F < 1.   
Confusion and Anger presented minor exceptions to this general trend.  Confusion continued to 
show a marginal trend towards exaggerated emotional intensity when comparing Occasions 2 
and 3, F(1, 351) = 7.16, p = .01. Anger had a more linear increase over occasions than did the 
other emotions, with a marginal difference between actual emotion at Occasion 1 and 
remembered emotion at Occasion 2, F(1, 351) = 5.95, p = .015, and a continued numerical trend 
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towards exaggeration between Occasions 2 and 3, F(1,351) = 2.77, p = .09.  However, the 
emotion showing the largest departure from the general pattern was Frustration, which showed 
no differences between Occasions, F < 1.    
Accuracy in Predicting Future Emotions  
 Accuracy in predicting future emotional intensity was analyzed using a 5 (Cohort:  0-4) x 
2 (Occasion: 2, 3) x 2 (Rating: Actual, Predicted) x 6 (Emotion) design. The 4-way interaction 
did not approach significance, p > .30. Because the central conceptual question of this analysis 
concerns the Rating factor (i.e., how do predicted versus actual ratings of emotional intensity 
differ), significant interactions not involving this factor (e.g., the 2-way interactions of Cohort 
and Emotion and of Occasion and Emotion) are not further discussed. Means and standard 
deviations for all cells in the 4-factor design are presented in Tables 2a and 2b.  
   The 3-way interaction between Occasion, Rating, and Emotion was statistically 
significant, F(5,1735) = 7.87, p < .0005, indicating that the accuracy of predictions across 
occasions was not the same across the different emotions. Inspection of the data suggested that 
for most emotions, when surveyed immediately after the attacks, people underestimated the 
intensity of their future emotions a year later whereas both predicted and actual emotions 
remained relatively stable between the second and third surveys. Shock was the exception, with 
exceptionally severe underestimation of future emotion at Occasion 1, and a numerical (though 
not significant) overestimation at Occasion 2. (See statistics below.) This tendency towards 
reversal for predictions at time 2 occurred because although predictions of future Shock 
remained largely stable (as was the case for other emotions), actual Shock continued to decline, 
as previously described. 
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In other words, although people generally underestimated the intensity of their future 
emotional responses, for most emotions, both actual and predicted intensity were stable one year 
after the attack. People were also relatively consistent in their predictions of future Shock, but 
the actual intensity ratings for this emotion continued to decline (as described earlier). Separate 
Rating x Occasion ANOVAs for each emotion confirmed these impressions. Predicted intensities 
were reliably higher than actual intensities (p < .01 for all emotions except Sadness (p = .03) and 
Fear (p = .09)). Only Shock showed a significant Rating x Occasion interaction, F(1, 351) = 
34.02, p < .0005. (All other emotions p > .40 except Sadness, p = .17). There was a significant 
difference between predicted and actual shock values between Surveys 1 and 2, t(351) = -7.03, p 
< .0005, but not between Surveys 2 and 3, t(351) = .58, p = .56. Actual shock showed a 
significant decline between Occasions 2 and 3, t(351) = 6.15, p < .0005, but predictions of Shock 
were relatively stable and, if anything, showed an effect in the opposite direction, t(351) = -2.42, 
p = .02.    
There was a statistically significant 3-way interaction between Rating, Emotion, and 
Cohort as well, F(20,1735) = 2.43, p = .001. Separate ANOVAs were run per each emotion with 
Rating as the within-subjects factor. The Rating x Cohort interaction did not approach 
significance for Sadness, Confusion, or Shock, both p > .20, suggesting that the degree of over-
prediction was equivalent across cohorts for these emotions.  Marginal Rating x Cohort 
interactions were found for Anger, F(4, 347) = 2.28, p = .06; Fear, F(4,347) = 2.71, p = .09; and 
Frustration, F(4, 347) = 2.01, p = .09.  Inspection of the means revealed that the pattern for 
Frustration differed from the other two.  The Rating effect (collapsed across Occasion) was then 
examined for each emotion within each cohort. For Anger and Fear, the youngest cohort had 
significant under-prediction of emotional intensity, F(1,80) = 12.29, p < .005 for Anger, F(1,80) 
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= 8.52, p < .01 for Fear, whereas the other cohorts generally showed smaller, marginal or 
nonsignificant differences, all p > .09. These findings are shown in Figures 5a and 5b. 
Frustration showed the opposite pattern: the youngest cohort was quite accurate, F < 1 whereas 
all other cohorts showed at least a trend towards underestimating future intensity, all p < .08, as 
seen in Figure 5c.   
Consistencies across Ratings and Occasions  
There were significant correlations between immediate emotional responses and those of 
Occasions 2 and 3. Current emotional response was also significantly correlated with people’s 
predictions of their future emotions on all three occasions. There were also significant 
correlations between projected emotional responses on Occasions 1 and 2 and actual responses. 
Remembrances of initial emotional intensity on Occasions 2 and 3 are correlated significantly 
with initial emotional intensities, with the exception of immediate intensity and recollection of 
shock from Occasion 3, r = .12, p = .027. For each of the previous correlations, p < .0005. 
Discussion 
 Overall, the findings of this study indicate that our perceptions of past and future 
emotions for an event like 9/11 are distorted. Past emotions are recalled as more intense than 
they were initially experienced, whereas the intensity of future emotions is underestimated. 
These findings bear some similarities to the distortions that occur when people make recency 
judgments about past events, or judge how long something will take them in the future.  In many 
cases, especially if judging events that occurred quite a while ago, past events are judged as 
being more recent than they actually are – as if they are viewed from a telescope and therefore 
perceived as “too close” (Loftus & Marberger, 1983; Rubin & Baddeley, 1989).  Likewise, in the 
present study, memories of past emotional intensities are exaggerated. When planning a future 
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project, people tend to show the opposite effect, as if the deadline were viewed through a 
“reverse telescope” and subjectively perceived as further away than it is in reality (see recent 
study by Peetz, Buehler, & Wilson, 2010, for discussion). Likewise, in the present study, the 
intensity of future emotions was underestimated, as if they were viewed from an exaggerated 
distance. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the oldest cohort reported the most intense anger initially, with 
sadness and shock showing trends of increased intensity for older cohorts. Their memories of all 
six emotions showed similar distortions as each of the other age groups, yet their predictions 
differed from younger cohorts for anger, fear and frustration. Accuracy of predictions increased 
with cohort for the former two emotions and decreased for the latter one. Below, the findings are 
briefly summarized, as well as their connections to the existing literature and potential areas for 
future research. 
Immediate Emotions and Change over Time 
 In the time period immediately following the attacks, the youngest cohort generally 
reported the least intense emotions. Most emotions then showed a small increase between the 
first three cohorts, then a generally stable level between the oldest two cohorts. Anger, however, 
continued its upward trajectory, with the oldest cohort reporting the most intense level. These 
findings stand in contrast to the idea that older adults show blunted emotional responses and to 
the usual finding that they are less sensitive to negative emotions than are younger adults. 
 One possible reason for this discrepancy in anger between older and younger age groups 
is the specific historical significance of the events of 9/11 and their meaning to the cohorts 
included in my analysis. The oldest group, the “World War II Cohort,” is defined by the 
Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, the first major surprise attack on American soil and the catalyst 
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of the United States’ involvement in the war. It could be that since this age group lived through 
an event similar to 9/11, they exhibit a stronger response of anger than those who do not have 
this prior experience since they are more aware of the consequences of the situation. Importantly, 
the higher ratings of emotional intensity given by this group for most emotions do not appear to 
be an artifact of a general tendency to use the upper end of the rating scale (Schwarz & Knäuper, 
2000), as shown by their low ratings for initial intensity of confusion and a lack of age 
differences when rating other variables, such as memory confidence. 
Cohort effects might also explain why the youngest group had the least intense emotions 
overall, but ranked highest in confusion. While 60% of the World War II cohort (in this study, 
Cohort 4) reported following news about public affairs most of the time, only 32% of Generation 
X (Cohort 1) and a staggering 8% of Generation Y (Cohort 0) could say the same (Bennett, 
2000). This notion is further supported in popular literature with David T. Z. Mindich’s book 
Tuned Out: Why Americans Under 40 Don’t Follow the News (2004), in which Mindich argues 
that young people have abandoned both general interest and political news. This lack of 
knowledge suggests that young adults would be less likely to understand the implications of 
9/11.   
 Immediate reactions of fear and frustration were experienced at relatively constant levels 
for all cohorts. Previous research has suggested that age has no effect on either of these 
emotions. Lau (2001) noted that self-reports of fear of snakes did not differ significantly between 
old and young adults, while LaBar, Cook, Torpey and Welsh-Bohmer (2004) demonstrated aging 
did not play a role in the ability to condition fear responses. In terms of frustration, it has been 
shown that not only is there no projected difference in frustration levels on the Rosenzweig 
Picture-Frustration Study once adolescence is reached (Lata, Mujtaba, & Joshi, 1992), but also 
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that age did not influence intensity of frustration when operating complicated electronic devices 
(Kang & Yoon, 2008).  
For all cohorts, emotional intensity dropped during the year following 9/11, and then 
stabilized, remaining at the same level at the second and third testing occasions. Shock was an 
exception, showing a steady decrease across assessments. This could be a result of the mere 
passing of time, which facilitates the loss of novelty that accompanies shock. An additional 
explanation could be that discussions of emotionally-charged events, such as those pertaining to 
treatment options for prostate cancer patients (Christie, Meyerowitz, Giedzinska-Simons, Gross, 
& Agus, 2009) or to watching a reenactment of a real-life rape (Lepore, Fernandez-Berrocal, 
Ragan, & Ramos, 2004), facilitate adjustment to that event and improve cognitive processing of 
it People also use such discussions to deal with the trauma associated with public tragic events 
(e.g., the death of Princess Diana), and these discussions decrease in frequency in as little as one 
month (Stone & Pennebaker, 2002). The events of 9/11 were widely discussed both in the 
general media and interpersonally, which could have contributed to the decline in shock across 
occasions. 
Emotions are Remembered More Intensely than They Actually Occurred 
 In this study, when subjects remembered their initial reactions a year later, all cohort 
groups overestimated the intensity they previously experienced. These inaccurate memories 
remained stable two years later, a finding that is comparable to the consistency of memory 
inaccuracies surrounding the reception event (i.e., how you found out about the attacks, who you 
were with, etc.) found by Berntsen and Thomsen (2005)and Hirst et al. (2009). These studies 
reported that the most rapid rate of decline in memory accuracy was seen within the first year, 
and significantly slowed in the following years, leading to consistent, yet false, memories 
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between Surveys 2 and 3. Nonetheless, why did participants overestimate their emotional 
reactions?   
 Social desirability effects may have played a role. Media coverage of the attack and its 
aftermath consistently portrayed it as a highly emotional event, and tied such strong emotional 
reactions to positive constructs, such as patriotism. Journalists emphasized the same sentiments 
as the federal government’s public announcements, 94% of which demonized terrorists and 
blamed them for the events of 9/11 (Hutcheson, Domke, Billeaudeaux, & Garland, 2004; see 
Gelpi, 2010, for a discussion of how such coverage influenced public attitudes towards related 
events such as the Iraq war). This may have especially been the case for older cohorts, who make 
up most of the audience for conservative media; over 60% of the viewers for Fox News shows 
such as Hannity and O’Reilly are over age 50 (Pew Research Center, 2010). In contrast, young 
adults make up the majority audiences for more liberal shows that were less likely to encourage 
aggressive responses (over 70% of the viewers of the Daily Show and Colbert Report are 
younger than 50). 
Predictions about Future Emotions Underestimate Their Intensity 
 Conversely from memories of emotions, predictions for all six emotions were 
underestimated by every cohort. Li and Brewer (2004) showed that nationalism surrounding 9/11 
is defined as unity in facing a common problem (i.e. fighting terrorism), a definition similar to 
the appraisal of a stressful situation as shared between group members in communal coping. 
Participants could have anticipated coping with their emotional reactions through the support of 
others due to the large amount of nationalist ideals being circulated by the media (Hutcheson et 
al., 2004). Research has shown that communal coping strategies elicited predictions of lower 
levels of emotional intensity for both survivors of genocide in Guatemala (Gasparre, Bosco, & 
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Bellelli, 2010) and people displaced from their homes in post-conflict Ethiopia (Araya, Chotai, 
Komproe, & de Jong, 2007) before therapy was completed, as opposed to actual feeling post-
treatment. That is, prior to group therapy, people predicted their emotions would be less intense 
than they actually were at its close. The ideas of nationalism developed from following the news 
coverage of 9/11 led to Americans participating in communal coping strategies, such as 
discussing the events with the people around them. At the time they made the predictions of 
future emotions, these coping strategies were still in effect.. Therefore, they experienced lower 
emotional intensities than they anticipated. 
The interactions between the degrees of under-prediction for different emotions across 
the cohorts are also of some interest.  The youngest cohort underestimated their future anger and 
fear, whereas older cohorts underestimated future frustration. Although speculative, one 
possibility is that the group differences in historical experience may have played a role in these 
distortions. Specifically, the youngest cohort would likely have been too young to have had 
much media exposure to US military conflicts, such as the Gulf War (Desert Shield/Desert 
Storm), and thus would not have experienced how such media could amplify such negative 
emotions towards opponent nations. Conversely, older cohorts who did have such experience 
with these conflicts, which were relatively easily resolved from the US perspective as compared 
to the still-ongoing “War on Terror”, may have had overly-optimistic expectations for how the 
foreign-policy implications of 9/11 would be resolved. This speculation receives some support 
from the rise in frustration shown by the oldest cohort on Occasion 3, especially since one of this 
generation’s defining characteristics was the success of World War II. 
 Even though there exists a relationship between the vividness of a memory and its 
emotional content, the connection is not necessarily applicable to the accuracy of the emotions 
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experienced recalled by flashbulb memories. This assumption is also relevant to one’s ability to 
predict their future emotions. That is, people of all ages are inaccurate in both recalling and 
predicting their emotional responses, at least in relation to the terrorist attacks of September 11th. 
Furthermore, the patterns of overestimated remembrances and underestimated predictions of 
emotion are the opposite of what is usually found in the literature. This suggests that emotions 
surrounding such public events are judged differently than those related to more personal events. 
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Cohort N Birth Years 
Age at 
Survey 1 
Memorable Events Key Characteristics 




1 118 1980-1966 21-35 
AIDS, Divorce/Single-
Parent Families, Fall of 
Berlin Wall  
Independent, 
Entrepreneurial 
2 54 1965-1954 36-47 
Watergate/Nixon Resigns, 
The Cold War, Disco 
Less Optimistic, 
Pragmatic 
3 39 1953-1946 48-55 
Assassinations of JFK & 
MLK, Vietnam War, 




4 60 1945-1928 56-73 
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Table 2a 
Average Predicted vs. Actual Emotional Intensities between Surveys 1 and 2 by Cohort  
                
    Emotions 
Cohort   Sadness Anger Fear Confusion Frustration Shock 
0 
Predicted 3.20 (1.24) 2.62 (1.24) 2.05 (1.06) 2.10 (1.14) 2.71 (1.42) 2.24 (1.31) 
Actual 3.45 (1.14) 3.06 (1.40) 2.47 (1.09) 2.32 (1.29) 2.80 (1.33) 2.91 (1.79) 
Difference 0.25 (1.27) 0.44 (1.18) 0.42 (1.06) 0.22 (1.49) 0.09 (1.31) 0.67 (2.00) 
    
      
1 
Predicted 3.25 (1.17) 2.60 (1.18) 2.27 (1.08) 1.94 (1.03) 2.47 (1.30) 2.05 (1.07) 
Actual 3.36 (1.18) 2.57 (1.30) 2.24 (1.14) 1.95 (1.09) 2.55 (1.24) 2.96 (1.81) 
Difference 0.11 (1.2) -0.03 (1.11) -0.03 (1.17) 0.01 (1.08) 0.08 (1.30) 0.91 (1.98) 
                
2 
Predicted 3.24 (1.16) 2.85 (1.37) 2.45 (1.29) 1.99 (1.07) 2.24 (1.17) 2.03 (1.04) 
Actual 3.57 (1.16) 3.07 (1.29) 2.47 (1.29) 2.25 (1.06) 2.68 (1.36) 2.74 (1.34) 
Difference 0.33 (1.15) 0.22 (1.13) 0.02 (1.17) 0.26 (0.91) 0.44 (1.42) 0.71 (1.29) 
                
3 
Predicted 3.19 (1.26) 3.17 (1.41) 2.76 (1.27) 2.08 (1.28) 2.68 (1.37) 2.65 (1.47) 
Actual 3.47 (1.37) 3.26 (1.59) 2.60 (1.33) 2.31 (1.34) 3.23 (1.51) 3.06 (1.59) 
Difference 0.28 (1.47) 0.09 (1.33) -0.16 (1.41) 0.23 (0.98) 0.55 (1.53) 0.41 (1.56) 
                
4 
Predicted 3.78 (1.10) 3.51 (1.37) 2.45 (1.37) 2.23 (1.30) 3.06 (1.44) 2.89 (1.53) 
Actual 3.63 (1.12) 3.39 (1.34) 2.58 (1.20) 2.28 (1.32) 3.13 (1.40) 3.23 (1.38) 
Difference -0.15 (1.14) -0.12 (1.21) 0.13 (1.40) 0.05 (0.95) 0.07 (1.41) 0.34 (1.57) 
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Table 2b 
Average Predicted vs. Actual Emotional Intensities between Surveys 2 and 3 by Cohort  
                
    Emotions 
Cohort   Sadness Anger Fear Confusion Frustration Shock 
0 
Predicted 3.49 (1.10) 2.90 (1.28) 2.46 (1.17) 2.27 (1.19) 2.88 (1.30) 2.43 (1.30) 
Actual 3.30 (1.09) 3.10 (1.27) 2.55 (1.17) 2.35 (1.21) 2.92 (1.30) 2.29 (1.20) 
Difference -0.19 (0.95) 0.20 (1.17) 0.09 (1.28) 0.08 (1.25) 0.04 (1.25) -0.14 (1.09) 
                
1 
Predicted 3.28 (1.16) 2.45 (1.24) 2.14 (1.00) 1.91 (1.06) 2.44 (1.27) 2.17 (1.15) 
Actual 3.36 (1.23) 2.81 (1.22) 2.17 (1.21) 2.05 (1.15) 2.67 (1.40) 2.24 (1.29) 
Difference 0.08 (1.23) 0.36 (1.21) 0.03 (1.04) 0.14 (1.45) 0.23 (1.31) 0.07 (1.23) 
                
2 
Predicted 3.70 (1.07) 3.15 (1.40) 2.49 (1.17) 2.14 (1.32) 2.29 (1.35) 2.44 (1.43) 
Actual 3.49 (1.20) 2.81 (1.30) 2.62 (1.15) 2.09 (1.21) 2.75 (1.35) 2.35 (1.16) 
Difference -0.21 (1.11) -0.34 (1.31) 0.13 (1.32) -0.05 (1.45) 0.46 (1.30) -0.09 (1.20) 
                
3 
Predicted 3.33 (1.26) 3.19 (1.13) 2.50 (1.13) 2.05 (1.28) 2.71 (1.44) 2.49 (1.24) 
Actual 3.34 (1.21) 3.06 (1.44) 2.24 (1.15) 2.06 (1.28) 3.06 (1.52) 2.42 (1.39) 
Difference 0.01 (1.12) -0.13 (1.07) -0.26 (1.38) 0.01 (1.71) 0.35 (1.38) -0.07 (1.21) 
    
      
4 
Predicted 3.50 (1.20) 3.33 (1.51) 2.50 (1.27) 2.07 (1.29) 3.05 (1.49) 3.16 (1.30) 
Actual 3.93 (1.10) 3.75 (1.26) 2.66 (1.24) 2.48 (1.34) 3.49 (1.34) 3.09 (1.41) 
Difference 0.43 (1.02) 0.42 (1.18) 0.16 (1.13) 0.41 (1.53) 0.44 (1.46) -0.07 (1.10) 
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Figure 2. Confidence in memory types by cohort. There is no statistical difference between 
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Figure 3a. Average change in Sadness from Surveys 1 to 3. There is a main effect of Occasion, 
F(2, 702) = 68.70, p < .0005. While ratings from Surveys 1 and 2 are significantly different (p < 
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Figure 3b. Average change in Anger from Surveys 1 to 3. There is a main effect of Occasion, F( 
2, 702) = 11.91, p < .0005. While ratings from Surveys 1 and 2 are significantly different (p < 
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Figure 3c. Average change in Fear from Surveys 1 to 3. There is a main effect of Occasion, F(2, 
702) = 80.59, p < .0005. While ratings from Surveys 1 and 2 are significantly different (p < 
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Figure 3d. Average change in Confusion from Surveys 1 to 3. There is a main effect of 
Occasion, F(2, 702) = 53.66, p < .0005. While ratings from Surveys 1 and 2 are significantly 
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Figure 3e. Average change in Frustration from Surveys 1 to 3. There is a main effect of 
Occasion, F(2, 702) = 34.72, p < .0005. While ratings from Surveys 1 and 2 are significantly 
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Figure 3f. Average change in Shock from Surveys 1 to 3. There is a main effect of Occasion, 
F(2, 702) = 97.83, p < .0005. Both Surveys 2 and 3 significantly differ from Survey 1, p < .0005; 
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Figure 4. Accuracy of recalled emotional intensities from Surveys 2 and 3. Occasion 1 represents 
the intensity of participants’ initial reactions, and Occasions 2 and 3 represent their memories of 
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Figure 5a. Accuracy of predicted Anger by cohort (collapesed across occasions). The youngest 
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Figure 5b. Accuracy of predicted Fear by cohort (collapsed across occasions). The youngest 
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Figure 5c. Accuracy of predicted Frustration by cohort (collapsed across occasions). The 
youngest cohort was relatively accurate, F < 1; all other cohorts showed at least a trend towards 
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Appendix A 
Evaluation of Emotional Intensity 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
For the following questions, we’d like you to tell us about your CURRENT FEELINGS 
CONCERNING THE ATTACK.  Please indicate your response by marking the appropriate 
point on the scales provided.  Note that you may indicate partial numbers (e.g. 3.5)  
1) At this moment, how strongly or intensely do you feel sad about the attack? 
(low)     1----------------2----------------3----------------4---------------5     (high) 
 
2) At this moment, how strongly or intensely do you feel angry about the attack? 
(low)     1----------------2----------------3----------------4---------------5     (high) 
 
3) At this moment, how strongly or intensely do you feel fear about the attack? 
(low)     1----------------2----------------3----------------4---------------5     (high) 
 
4) At this moment, how strongly or intensely do you feel confusion about the attack? 
(low)     1----------------2----------------3----------------4---------------5     (high) 
 
5) At this moment, how strongly or intensely do you feel frustration about the attack? 
(low)     1----------------2----------------3----------------4---------------5     (high) 
 
6) At this moment, how strongly or intensely do you feel shock about the attack? 
(low)     1----------------2----------------3----------------4---------------5     (high) 
______________________________________________________________________________
Note. The same evaluation was used on all three surveys for current, recalled and predicted 
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emotions. For recalled emotions, “current feelings concerning the attack” was substituted for 
“feelings concerning the attack in the 2 weeks following the attack. For predicted emotions, 
“How do you think you’ll feel about the attack one year from now” was substituted on Survey 1 
and “How do you think you’ll feel about the attack 2 years from now” was substituted on Survey 
2.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
